
Year Of The Four Emperors

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THE YEAR OF THE FOUR EMPERORS: ROME'S DESCENT INTO CIVIL WAR

In the annals of Roman history, few periods are as dramatic and chaotic as AD 69, a year so tumultuous that it earned the name **Year Of The Four Emperors**. This twelve-month span saw no fewer than four men claim the ultimate prize of the Roman Empire—Galba, Otho, Vitellius, and Vespasian—each rising and falling in a brutal sequence of coups, battles, and betrayals. The Year Of The Four Emperors was not merely a revolving door of rulers; it was a crucible that tested the very foundations of the Principate, exposed the fragility of imperial succession, and paved the way for the stable Flavian dynasty. Understanding this pivotal year offers profound insights into Roman politics, military power, and the nature of autocracy.

The End of the Julio-

Claudian Dynasty and the Power Vacuum

The seeds of the Year Of The Four Emperors were sown in the final, paranoid years of Nero's reign. When Nero committed suicide in June AD 68, he left no heir and the Julio-Claudian dynasty, which had ruled Rome since Augustus, collapsed. The Roman system of succession had never been formally codified; it relied on dynastic bloodlines, adoption, and the tacit approval of the Praetorian Guard, the Senate, and the legions. Nero's extinction shattered that fragile consensus. The empire suddenly faced a constitutional crisis: who had the right to be emperor?

Into this void stepped Servius Sulpicius Galba, the elderly governor of Hispania Tarraconensis. Galba had been proclaimed emperor by his troops and was recognized by the Senate after Nero's death. He seemed a safe, experienced choice—a stern traditionalist who promised to restore discipline after Nero's excesses. But Galba's reign was doomed from the start. He alienated the Praetorian Guard by refusing to pay the donative (a traditional bribe), offended the legions on the German frontier by dismissing their loyalty, and antagonized the populace with

OTHO VERSUS VITELLIUS: THE FIRST PITCHED BATTLE
 support.

THE RISE AND FALL OF GALBA: A LESSON IN AUSTERE INCOMPETENCE

Galba's primary mistake was his failure to secure loyalty through the usual means: money and patronage. When he entered Rome, he famously declared that he "levied soldiers, not bought them," a noble sentiment but a political catastrophe. The Praetorians, the elite bodyguard that had made and unmade emperors for decades, expected a generous gift upon his accession. Galba's refusal was seen as a direct insult. Meanwhile, the legions in Lower Germany mutinied when Galba replaced their popular commander. Sensing weakness, Galba made a fatal error in succession policy: he adopted a young nobleman named Lucius Calpurnius Piso Licinianus as his heir, bypassing the ambitious and charismatic Marcus Salvius Otho.

Otho, a former friend of Nero and governor of Lusitania, had been Galba's most prominent supporter. He expected to be named heir. Humiliated and outraged, Otho bribed the disgruntled Praetorians, who proclaimed him emperor on January 15, AD 69. Galba and Piso were dragged from the Forum and brutally murdered. Galba's reign—the first of the Year Of The Four Emperors—lasted just over six months. His story demonstrates that in the imperial system, legitimacy without military and financial backing was worthless.

FOR THE EMPIRE

Otho's accession was greeted with relief in Rome, but his position was immediately threatened by the legions in Germania Inferior. Those legions had already declared for their own commander, Aulus Vitellius, a senator of no great military reputation but with strong ties to the German army. Vitellius's forces, numbering some 70,000 men, began marching south toward Italy. Otho, who had little military experience but considerable political cunning, prepared to defend his throne.

The Battle of Bedriacum and Otho's Tragic End

Otho assembled a large army from the Danube legions and the Praetorian cohorts. He chose to meet Vitellius in northern Italy rather than wait for reinforcements, a decision that proved disastrous. At the First Battle of Bedriacum (also known as the Battle of Cremona) in April AD 69, Otho's forces were decisively defeated. Rather than prolong a civil war that would shed more Roman blood, Otho made an astonishing decision: he committed suicide, stating that it was better to die honorably than to see the empire torn apart. His death after only three months as emperor earned him posthumous praise even from his enemies.

Vitellius marched into Rome and was recognized by the Senate. He was the third emperor of the Year Of The Four Emperors. His

reign, however, was characterized by gluttony, cruelty, and incompetence. He allowed his German legions to plunder Rome, alienated the optimates (aristocracy), and spent lavishly on banquets while the treasury was empty. Vitellius might have survived had he been a stronger ruler, but he made the same mistake as Galba: he failed to consolidate control over the entire empire.

VESPASIAN: THE GENERAL WHO SAVED THE EMPIRE

While Vitellius feasted in Rome, the eastern provinces were simmering with discontent. Titus Flavius Vespasianus—Vespasian—was the commander of the Roman forces in Judaea, where he was suppressing the Jewish Revolt. Vespasian was a seasoned, practical soldier from a humble Italian family. He had no dynastic claim, but he had the loyalty of three powerful legions (the Legio X Fretensis, Legio V Macedonica, and Legio XV Apollinaris) and the support of the governor of Syria, Gaius Licinius Mucianus.

On July 1, AD 69, the legions of Egypt declared for Vespasian. Soon after, the legions in Syria and Judaea followed suit. Vespasian did not immediately march on Rome; he understood that time was on his side. Instead, he sent his general Mucianus with a strong army to Italy, while another general, Gaius Primus, marched through the Balkans with the Danubian legions. Vespasian also secured the vital grain supply from Egypt, threatening Rome with famine.

The Second Battle of Bedriacum and the Fall of Vitellius

Vitellius's forces were already depleted by defections and poor leadership. The Danubian legions, loyal to Vespasian, entered Italy and met the Vitellian army near Cremona in October AD 69. In the Second Battle of Bedriacum, the Flavians achieved a crushing victory. The city of Cremona was sacked and burned. Vitellius tried to negotiate but his support evaporated. The Praetorians, seeing the tide turn, abandoned him. On December 20, AD 69, Vitellius was dragged from the imperial palace, killed by the mob in the streets of Rome, and his body thrown into the Tiber. The Year Of The Four Emperors was over.

AFTERMATH AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE FLAVIAN DYNASTY

Vespasian arrived in Rome in late AD 70, after the dust had settled. He was immediately recognized by the Senate and began a systematic program of reform. His reign (AD 69–79) restored stability, discipline, and financial health to the empire. He disbanded the unreliable Praetorian cohorts and replaced them with men loyal to him. He reformed taxation, built the Colosseum (the Flavian Amphitheatre), and suppressed the Batavian revolt in Gaul and the Jewish Revolt in Judaea.

Most importantly, Vespasian established the Flavian dynasty, which would rule until AD 96. He passed power to his sons, Titus and Domitian, showing that the empire could thrive under a non-aristocratic, military-backed ruler. The Year Of The Four Emperors thus had a lasting legacy: it proved that the emperor was, in essence, whoever controlled the legions. But it also showed that the Roman system could survive crisis. The crisis of AD 69 forced the empire to evolve, leading to the concept of the *optimates princeps*—the best man for the job rather than the man with the right bloodline.

Key Lessons from the Year Of The Four Emperors

The events of AD 69 hold several important lessons for historians and students of political power:

- **Military loyalty is the ultimate currency of imperial Rome.** Each of the four emperors rose and fell based on the support of specific legions.
- **Financial mismanagement is fatal.** Galba and Vitellius both failed because they could not secure the funds to pay off troops and Praetorians.
- **Speed and decisiveness matter.** Otho lost because he hesitated; Vespasian won because he moved methodically but decisively.

- **Provincial legions can trump the Italian heartland.** The Danube and Eastern legions were the real power brokers in AD 69.
- **Civil war, no matter how brutal, does not necessarily mean the end of an empire.** Rome's institutions proved resilient enough to absorb the shock.

CONCLUSION: THE CRUCIBLE OF IMPERIAL DESTINY

The Year Of The Four Emperors was a terrifying but transformative period for ancient Rome. In just twelve months, the empire witnessed the murder of an emperor (Galba), the suicide of another (Otho), the violent death of a third (Vitellius), and the eventual triumph of a pragmatic general (Vespasian). The chaos of AD 69 exposed the ugly truth at the heart of the Augustan settlement: the Roman Empire was a military autocracy disguised as a restored republic. Yet out of that bloodshed came a more stable, more efficient imperial system. The Flavian dynasty that emerged from the **Year Of The Four Emperors** restored confidence, built lasting monuments, and steered the empire into its golden age in the second century.

For any student of Roman history—or indeed of political power in any era—the events of AD 69 serve as a stark reminder that legitimacy is rarely inherited; it must be earned by force, cunning, and the ability to command loyalty. The story of the four emperors is not just a tale of ambition and violence; it is the story of how the Roman Empire learned to survive itself.